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FINRA 21-19 is a long overdue change. It is clear that the integrity of the United States market has been strained to the edge of disaster, in large part due to systemic risk developed under the regulatory authority of FINRA's outdated short interest reporting policy. While many of the policies mentioned in Regulatory Notice 21-19 address the general breadth of exploitable and ineffective
FINRA 21-19 is a long overdue change. It is clear that the integrity of the United States market has been strained to the edge of disaster, in large part due to systemic risk developed under the regulatory authority of FINRA's outdated short interest reporting policy. While many of the policies mentioned in Regulatory Notice 21-19 address the general breadth of exploitable and ineffective
FINRA 21-19 is a long overdue change. It is clear that the integrity of the United States market has been strained to the edge of disaster, in large part due to systemic risk developed under the regulatory authority of FINRA's outdated short interest reporting policy. While many of the policies mentioned in Regulatory Notice 21-19 address the general breadth of exploitable and ineffective
FINRA 21-19 is a long overdue change. It is clear that the integrity of the United States market has been strained to the edge of disaster, in large part due to systemic risk developed under the regulatory authority of FINRA's outdated short interest reporting policy. While many of the policies mentioned in Regulatory Notice 21-19 address the general breadth of exploitable and ineffective
As a mostly outside observer who has be diving into the inner workings of the mechanics behind short selling, I've noticed that the lack of transparency effectively makes it impossible to determine the overall value of the short positions that exist, along with a lack of information about how many synthetic shares are created and how positions are opening and closing on a regular basis. This
FINRA 21-19 is a long overdue change. It is clear that the integrity of the United States market has been strained to the edge of disaster, in large part due to systemic risk developed under the regulatory authority of FINRA's outdated short interest reporting policy. While many of the policies mentioned in Regulatory Notice 21-19 address the general breadth of exploitable and ineffective
FINRA 21-19 is a long overdue change. It is clear that the integrity of the United States market has been strained to the edge of disaster, in large part due to systemic risk developed under the regulatory authority of FINRA's outdated short interest reporting policy. While many of the policies mentioned in Regulatory Notice 21-19 address the general breadth of exploitable and ineffective
FINRA 21-19 is a long overdue change. It is clear that the integrity of the United States market has been strained to the edge of disaster, in large part due to systemic risk developed under the regulatory authority of FINRA's outdated short interest reporting policy. While many of the policies mentioned in Regulatory Notice 21-19 address the general breadth of exploitable and ineffective
FINRA 21-19 is a long overdue change. It is clear that the integrity of the United States market has been strained to the edge of disaster, in large part due to systemic risk developed under the regulatory authority of FINRA's outdated short interest reporting policy. While many of the policies mentioned in Regulatory Notice 21-19 address the general breadth of exploitable and ineffective
FINRA 21-19 is a long overdue change. It is clear that the integrity of the United States market has been strained to the edge of disaster, in large part due to systemic risk developed under the regulatory authority of FINRA's outdated short interest reporting policy. While many of the policies mentioned in Regulatory Notice 21-19 address the general breadth of exploitable and ineffective